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Maria Helen Murphy
Department of Law, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland
ABSTRACT
Supporters of increased surveillance see tremendous potential in
the ever increasing creation, collection, and retention of personal
data. Most acknowledge that the massive collection of
information also creates challenges where the collection outpaces
the ability to meaningfully process the data. Increased processing
power and more finely tuned algorithms are often portrayed as
the solution to this haystack conundrum. While a human may
struggle to find the needle in an overflowing haystack of
disordered information, powerful computers can take a logical
and structured approach that will make the haystack eminently
more searchable. This article evaluates this premise from a human
rights perspective and considers whether algorithmic surveillance
systems can be designed to be compatible with the right to
privacy. In addition to assessing the incongruity between
traditional safeguards (such as foreseeability and accountability)
with algorithmic surveillance, this article also confronts the
problem of initial collection and addresses the contention that
well-defined algorithmic search can effectively limit the
intrusiveness of surveillance. Evolution in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the
European Union will be factored into this analysis.
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Introduction
As humans are inherently self-documenting, the increased use and sophistication of com-
munications technologies, has led to previously unfathomable amounts of personal data
being generated by the average individual (Crampton 2015; Miller 2013). A notable aspect
of this is the proliferation of GPS enabled smart phones as aggregated location data can
lead to the inference of much sensitive information about an individual’s movements, con-
nections, and relationships with others (Gellman and Soltani 2013b; Richards and King
2013). The increased generation of information has been a boon to intelligence agencies
seeking to collect ever increasing amounts of personal information. Combining these
developments with reduced data storage costs, significant government investment in
intelligence collection, and government support for bulk retention, intelligence agencies
have never had greater access to information regarding the general population. While
individual data points may be revealing, the aggregation of data from a multitude of
sources has the potential to be profoundly more intrusive and the expansion of the
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surveillance assemblage has been striking (Felten 2013, 716). Huge amounts of data can
also be a burden if information is being collected to such an extent so as to overwhelm
those tasked with the duty of interpreting and acting on that data. Algorithms, with
their capacity to organise and process large quantities of data efficiently, appear to
offer a solution to this problem (MacCormick 2012).
This article assesses the use of algorithmic surveillance from a privacy perspective and
considers how the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) may be used to respond
to such techniques. Once the background jurisprudence has been discussed, this article
reflects on current developments in European case law that might influence the future
modus operandi of intelligence agencies. An interesting aspect of the developments in
Europe has been the cross-fertilisation between the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In this article, the recent
decisions of the ECtHR in Roman Zakharov v Russia and Szabó and Vissy v Hungary and
the decision of the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland receive particular attention.1 Before
delving into the case law, however, it is important to first consider the concept of algorith-
mic surveillance in more depth.
Algorithmic surveillance
When dealing with large collections of data, algorithm-based data mining can be used to
process and filter bulk datasets (Gillespie 2016; Cheney-Lippold 2011). The data sets are
filtered using selectors, such as selectors relating to language, key words, communication
paths and other technical data (Venice Commission 2015, 11). For example, previously
identified suspect telephone numbers may be used as selectors in order to identify new
potential suspects. An individual who is in contact with a number of individuals under sus-
picion can be highlighted as a potential target for further scrutiny (Venice Commission
2015, 11–12). While the term ‘algorithm’ can be very simply defined as a ‘sequence of com-
putational steps that transform the input into the output’, machine learning algorithms
‘modify their processing operations autonomously on the basis of newly acquired infor-
mation’ (Johns 2015; Cormen et al. 2009; Witten, Frank, and Hall 2011).
Profiles play a crucial role in algorithmic surveillance. The development of suspect pro-
files involves the collection and processing of information in order to make assumptions
about a data subject and his or her ‘future behaviour’ (Korff 2012; Korff 2015, 23). Profiles
are constructed based on correlations between certain actions – often fundamentally non-
incriminating – and certain behaviours or associations. To provide a basic example, an indi-
vidual who purchases an airline ticket with cash, travels under a name not associated with
the registered phone number, has a nervous disposition, and does not check-in any
baggage may be identified as a ‘probable drug trafficker’.2 Such an identification could
then trigger a more in depth investigation of that individual.3 While that is a simple illus-
tration, a powerful machine learning algorithm can analyse ‘exponentially more data
points’ and can identify more complex relationships than is possible when applying a tra-
ditional police profile (Rich 2015–2016, 905; Flach 2012, 9; Heumann and Cassak 2001,
919–921). In addition, precise weightings can be applied to different factors in the
profile (Flach 2012, 25–32). Andrejevic states that ‘[t]he promise of predictive analytics is
to incorporate the future as a set of anticipated data points into the decision-making
process’ (2013, 24). In effect, the shift from investigation to prediction means that
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investigative authorities are pursuing a ‘potential terrorist, a subject who is not yet fully in
view, who may be unnamed and as yet unrecognizable’ (Amoore 2014, 108–112).
As the aim of strategic surveillance is to be proactive by identifying threats rather than
investigating known threats, in practical terms, this requires the identification of ‘high risk’
individuals based on algorithmic selectors and profiles (Venice Commission 2015, 12; Korff
2015, 41). Strategic surveillance is prevalent in surveillance operations where the preven-
tion of terrorist attacks is the primary goal and where the prosecution of terrorists for com-
mitting terrorist acts serves as a less prioritised secondary objective (Venice Commission
2015, 3). Such an approach is appealing from a security perspective but poses clear
risks for human rights (Venice Commission 2015, 35). In addition to constituting a threat
to privacy – as is focused on in this article – where the network of targeted individuals
is likely to include subversives, members of minority religious groups, and journalists
there are also clear implications for the protection of free speech and the prevention of
discrimination. At a point in time where mass surveillance is under ever increasing scrutiny
from human rights authorities, it is important to recall that mass data collection and algo-
rithmic processing are inherently interlinked. Not only does algorithmic processing enable
the filtering and sorting of huge data sets into manageable outputs, but effective algorith-
mic analysis depends on large and accurate data sets.4 Having set out the manner in which
algorithmic methods are used to process large collections of data, it is now necessary to
consider the privacy implications of such techniques.
The right to privacy and algorithmic surveillance
From a European Convention on Human Rights perspective, the Article 8 right to respect
for private life is most pertinent to the issue of generalised surveillance and the sub-
sequent algorithmic processing of data collected through surveillance.5 Even though
the ECtHR has interpreted the scope of ‘private life’ broadly, it accepts that it is not an
absolute right and that it can be limited where the intrusion is ‘in accordance with the
law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in the pursuit of a ‘legitimate aim’.6 Each of
these requirements is mandatory and cumulative. The concept of a legitimate aim is
broadly drawn, with legitimate aims including the prevention of disorder or crime, the pro-
tection of public safety, economic well-being, and the rights and freedoms of others. It will
often not be too difficult to determine whether a particular surveillance measure is con-
ducted in the pursuit of a legitimate aim as surveillance measures are generally directed
at the prevention of crime and the protection of public safety. In fact, it can be argued that
the inclusion of the word ‘prevention’ in the second paragraph of Article 8 provides some
support for the practice of strategic surveillance. While it may be a straightforward matter
to identify a legitimate aim to support the generalised collection and filtering of personal
information by government authorities, this is not the end of the inquiry when determin-
ing compliance with criteria under Article 8.
Once a legitimate aim has been identified, the ECtHR will consider whether the measure
is ‘in accordance with the law’. The ECtHR has clarified that in addition to requiring a legal
basis for intrusive action, domestic laws should provide adequate accessibility and foresee-
ability for individuals.7 These are related obligations and constitute essential rule of law
values that protect against abuses of power. The accessibility requirement that individuals
must have an adequate indication as to the legal rules applicable to a given case has
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meant that historically secretive practices, such as covert surveillance, must now be sup-
ported by a publicly accessible legal basis.8 The foreseeability requirement mandates that
laws be formulated ‘with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct’.9
While foreseeability in the surveillance context ‘cannot mean that an individual should be
able to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he
can adapt his conduct accordingly’,10 the risk of arbitrary covert action necessitates the
provision of ‘clear, detailed rules’.11 Crucially, the domestic law must indicate the scope
and manner of exercise of any discretion conferred on the competent authorities in
order to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.12 In
search of a practical means of preventing arbitrary interference in the opaque world of sur-
veillance, the ECtHR has developed a number of safeguards that must be set out in law in
order to prevent abuses of surveillance powers.13 According to the ECtHR, seriously intru-
sive surveillance measures should be provided for in legislation that sets out:
the nature of offences which may give rise to an interception order; the definition of the cat-
egories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone
tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the
precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circum-
stances in which recordings may or must be erased or destroyed.14
While these safeguards were originally developed to protect against abuse of individua-
lised surveillance methods, in the case of Weber and Saravia, the ECtHR confirmed that
safeguards are equally important in the context of strategic surveillance.15 The ECtHR
has addressed the issue of generalised as opposed to individualised surveillance in a
number of decisions.16 While merely a decision on admissibility, the reasoning in Weber
and Saravia is widely regarded as very significant. The decision considers strategic moni-
toring and has been frequently cited with approval in subsequent rulings on surveil-
lance.17 In Weber and Saravia, the Court distinguished ‘individual’ from ‘strategic’
monitoring by pointing out that individual monitoring ‘serves to avert or investigate
certain grave offences which the persons monitored are suspected of planning or
having committed’.18 The key is individualised suspicion. In contrast, the measures exam-
ined in Weber and Saravia were
aimed at collecting information by intercepting telecommunications in order to identify and
avert serious dangers facing the Federal Republic of Germany, such as an armed attack on its
territory or the commission of international terrorist attacks and certain other serious
offences.19
Even though the strategic surveillance regime did not constitute blanket surveillance of
the entire population, the collection was indiscriminate with respect to the existence or
absence of any suspicion of criminal involvement.
The ECtHR reviewed the safeguards outlined in the German legislation and found them
to meet the standards discussed above to the level necessary in order to give citizens ‘an
adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the
public authorities were empowered to resort to monitoring measures’.20 The German
regime provided extensive safeguards but the application of standards developed in
the context of individualised surveillance raised some novel questions for the ECtHR.
The challenge of applying standards developed to regulate targeted surveillance to stra-
tegic surveillance scenarios, illustrates how developments in surveillance practices can
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result in the evolution of established principles. Even though different issues arise in the
setting of standards for the duration, use, communication, retention of data, etc. in the
context of strategic surveillance,21 the issue of how to categorise potential surveillance
targets is particularly relevant when considering the role of algorithms. As strategic surveil-
lance is inherently generalised, the regime examined in Weber and Saravia raised some
questions as to how the requirements for laws to detail ‘the nature of offences’ which
may give rise to surveillance and ‘categories of people’ liable to surveillance could be met.
While it is a straightforward task to delineate the relevant offences and persons liable to
targeting when surveillance is being directed at individuals; generalised, strategic surveil-
lance creates new challenges. In addition to being detrimental to free expression and sanc-
tity of thought, a law that clearly states that every individual is the potential (or actual)
subject of surveillance, renders any foreseeability benefit superficial and potentially chil-
ling of speech and action. In Weber and Saravia, the ECtHR highlighted that the legislation
indicated the categories of person liable to have their communications intercepted.
According to the law, participants in international telephone conversations via satellite
connections or radio relay links and participants in international telephone conversations
via fixed telephone lines where the monitoring was conducted to avert an armed attack on
Germany were potentially liable to surveillance.22 In addition, if German nationals were to
be subjected to surveillance, they were required to use certain catchwords in order to
trigger an investigation.23 While surveillance was carried out in Weber and Saravia
without the existence of traditional individualised suspicion, the ECtHR emphasised the
fact that the information was filtered through the use of ‘catchwords’ that were suitable
for the ‘investigation of the dangers described in the monitoring order’.24 The fact that
the ECtHR examined a surveillance system where government authorities filtered surveil-
lance information through the application of predetermined selectors is, of course, highly
pertinent to algorithmic surveillance. Crucially, the German law required that catchwords
be listed in the monitoring order which meant that the catchwords were recorded and
subject to supervision by an independent authority (the G10 Commission).25 The use of
catchwords in conjunction with the provision of an extensive system of safeguards
would appear to be important as the ECtHR subsequently found a UK system of general-
ised surveillance that utilised filtering catchwords to be in violation of the ECHR due to the
lack of accessible information regarding how the system and its safeguards operated.26
The decision inWeber and Saravia to recognise the use of filtering catchwords as a safe-
guard could be seen as an endorsement of the contention that algorithmic filtering of
mass data sets can have a positive human rights effect. Proportionality is a requirement
of Article 8 and the use of filtering catchwords can be viewed as a minimisation technique
that reduces the scope of intrusive measures. The Venice Commission has suggested that
the use of relevant and specific selectors can be used to limit unnecessary intrusion
(Venice Commission 2015, 11–12). In other surveillance contexts, algorithms have been
used to minimise data retention and to restrict access to data deemed irrelevant to the
legitimate purpose of detecting suspicious behaviour (Neyland 2016).27 This position
has intuitive appeal. As evidenced by the mass adoption of many online products and
the indifference of some to reports of automated scanning of emails and photographs
stored in the cloud, it appears that many individuals feel less violated when a ‘computer’
carries out surveillance as opposed to a human (Gibbs 2014). While the strategic collection
of data entails the absence of individualised suspicion, the filtering of the data through the
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use of certain independently reviewed catchwords limits the additional intrusion. It could
be argued that reasonable suspicion can be inferred from individual use of a relevant
catchword, such as ‘bomb’, ‘nuclear’, or ‘rocket’ (‘Secret services ramp up online surveil-
lance’ 2012). Setting aside for now the fact that such an approach appears to ignore the
intrusive effect of the initial collection, even if this argument is accepted, it is challenging
to imagine how the protection provided by the use of simple and understandable selec-
tors translates to the use of modern complex algorithms. The difficulty of ensuring foresee-
ability and accountability is increased exponentially when algorithms are dynamic and
where the eventual criteria for selection are impossible to predict.
Traditionally, the existence of individualised suspicion has been determined by human
actors based on a non-technical assessment of probabilities. Factors such as who the
target is, where they have been, what they have done, and when have they done it can
all be considered when assessing the probability of a criminal act being committed.
Modern data mining and machine learning capabilities would appear to threaten the tra-
ditional model and present the possibility that more accurate determinations of prob-
ability could be made based on complex analysis of detailed data sets (Rich 2015–2016,
877–888).28 For example, machine learning techniques can be used to reveal ‘otherwise
unrecognizable patterns in complex processes underlying observable phenomena’ (Rich
2015–2016, 874–875; Alpaydin 2014, 2).
Sophisticated investigatory programmes use machine learning processes in an effort to
predict individual criminality based on algorithms (Eligon and Williams 2015; Harcourt
2007; Rich 2015–2016, 876). Where data are imperfect, systems can make ‘probabilistic
predictions’ based on pattern recognition (Rich 2015–2016, 876; Alpaydin 2014, 2–3). Cru-
cially, modern technologies allow for the automation of the process where a programme
can search for correlations in the data set that may indicate criminal activity and to
develop its approach and iteratively ‘learn’ over time (Rich 2015–2016, 876). As a
dynamic algorithm continues to interrogate data, identify patterns, and develop, the pro-
cesses of the algorithm can become opaque even to those who designed it (Gillespie, 172;
De Zwart, Humphreys, and Van Dissel 2014, 718). As pointed out by Korff, the dynamic
refining of selectors means that the algorithms ‘lose the link with the originally simple
(or at least relatively simple) “selectors”’ (2015, 41). While the ECtHR has consistently recog-
nised that the concept of foreseeability in the surveillance context does not mean that
individuals should be able to predict when they may be subject to surveillance, the appli-
cation of machine learning in the surveillance contexts presents a striking, perhaps uncon-
querable obstacle to the provision of foreseeability.
The challenges of providing foreseeability and accountability in the context of algorith-
mic surveillance may be impossible to overcome,29 but even if a sufficiently protective
regime could be developed, the requirement that the system be necessary in a democratic
society would remain. Most surveillance programmes are designed to respond to a per-
ceived social need, but the Convention requires the response to be proportionate to
that legitimate aim.30 Accordingly, in order to be compatible with the Convention, a sur-
veillance system should be suitable and should strike a reasonable balance between the
various competing interests (Gerards 2012, 200; Christoffersen 2009, 69; Arai-Takahashi
2002, 11).31
Unfortunately, many algorithmically driven surveillance systems would appear to fall at
the first hurdle by not even being suitable to achieve the legitimate aim.32 An inherent
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problem with such surveillance is the base rate fallacy and the high likelihood of ‘false
positives’ (Korff 2010, 22; Schneier 2006). False positives are particularly likely – and par-
ticularly harmful – when algorithmic techniques are used to identify potential terrorists.
Due to the rarity of terrorist attacks, pattern searching is liable to mistakes. While the inher-
ently probabilistic nature of such determinations is not a serious problem when the con-
sequence is an online advertisement targeting an uninterested consumer, an incorrect
categorisation as a terrorist can have significant human rights implications for the incor-
rectly targeted individual (Schneier 2015, 137). Not only that, but in such a system, false
categorisations of actual terrorists as probable non-terrorists are also likely to occur (Groth-
off and Porup 2016). As a result, the use of such techniques not only harms falsely targeted
individuals, but can also squander resources that could be more effectively used on more
traditional or more targeted investigative techniques (Thomson 2016). As intelligence
agencies use machine learning in order to process huge amounts of data, another
problem occurs (Moody 2016; Danezis 2016). In order to ensure the effectiveness and
accuracy of an algorithm in identifying potential terrorists, it must be both trained and
tested using different data sets. This is an impossible task where little information about
‘known terrorists’ is available to ‘train and test the model’ (Grothoff and Porup 2016).
When the ECtHR has considered the issue of necessity in the surveillance context it has
stated that surveillance measures must be ‘strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic
institutions’. The ECtHR focuses on the existence of safeguards when examining this ques-
tion and considers whether the system provides ‘adequate and effective safeguards
against abuse’.33 Whether or not a regime provides adequate and effective guarantees
against abuse:
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the
possible measures, the grounds required for ordering such measures, the authorities compe-
tent to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and the kind of remedy provided by the
national law.34
To best ensure compliance with Convention principles, surveillance measures should be
subject to independent supervision at each stage of data collection and analysis. If algor-
ithms are used to filter surveillance data they must be reviewed in order to ensure that
surveillance powers are not exercised arbitrarily. To ensure the effectiveness of supervi-
sion, procedural protections are not only required at the design of the algorithms or
rule-making stage but should also apply to decisions made based on algorithmic predic-
tions (Citron and Pasquale 2014, 19; Bosco et al. 2015). In the general context of algorith-
mic determinations, Crawford and Schulz argue that the auditing of ‘the data that was
used to make a determination’ would provide a beneficial safeguard (Crawford and
Schultz 2014, 117; De Zwart, Humphreys, and Van Dissel 2014, 721). Even where secrecy
is an operational necessity, accountability should still be provided through oversight
mechanisms. While the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs acknowl-
edges the necessity of ‘a certain level of secrecy’ in order to protect ongoing surveillance
operations, the Committee maintains that ‘such secrecy cannot override or exclude rules
on democratic and judicial scrutiny’ or other rule of law values such as transparency
(Moraes 2014, 19). Similarly, Anderson has reported that while some secrecy may be
necessary in the surveillance context, adequate safeguards and ‘direct public engagement’
are also required (Anderson 2015, 190–191). The ECtHR has a clear preference for
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entrusting supervisory control to members of the judiciary, but have accepted alternatives
where they are adequately independent of the executive (McIntyre 2016).35 The review of
algorithmic surveillance may be a sensible case for a modified approach where an inde-
pendent expert group with technical and legal expertise could review the operation of
the system and report on its workings. A condition for the effectiveness of such a
review system would require immutable audit logs to be generated automatically.
Access to this information would enable the reviewing authority to interrogate whether
the system was operating effectively and appropriately (Citron and Pasquale 2011,
1473). Not only is such informed review important to ensure that surveillance powers
are not being arbitrarily exercised, but it is also essential to enable individual targets to
pursue redress (Citron 2007).36
The ECtHR has grown increasingly supportive of the need to notify surveillance targets
subsequent to the cessation of surveillance where possible.37 Where an activity is carried
out in secret, subsequent notification is ‘inextricably linked to the effectiveness of reme-
dies’ and to the effectiveness of safeguards against abuse.38 If an individual has been tar-
geted for additional surveillance based on an algorithmic determination, that decision
should not be immune from scrutiny. It has been pointed out that determinations
based on algorithmic processes are extremely difficult to contest and can in fact
become ‘effectively unchallengeable if the underlying “intelligence” and the evaluations
of the “intelligence” and the precise algorithm used to weigh the various elements of
the “intelligence” cannot be challenged’ (Korff 2015, 21–22). As this is an issue with
mere commercial algorithms, vigorously guarded by trade secrets, problems of transpar-
ency are only magnified in the covert surveillance context. Furthermore, there are signifi-
cant practical reasons that hinder transparency and the potential for effective remedies in
the algorithmic surveillance context.
When dealing with modern algorithmic processes, the interpretability of their operation
is a substantial barrier to effective oversight. This may be true at the point where the
systems are designed – for example if reviewers do not have sufficient technical expertise
– and there may also be challenges once the system is in effect and general oversight of its
operation is being carried out. Such issues will also exist wherever a reviewing or remedial
body must assess whether the algorithmic targeting of a specific individual was reason-
able. Where automated predictions are not explainable in human language it is difficult
to justify why a particular individual was targeted for ‘differentiated treatment’ (Zarsky
2013, 1519–1520). At a general level, the opacity of such determinations can shield a sur-
veillance system from scrutiny and hinder the public access and debate that is an essential
bulwark against arbitrary use (Citron 2007, 1254–1258; De Zwart, Humphreys, and Van
Dissel 2014, 714–715).
Even setting aside the many challenges discussed so far, algorithmic surveillance –
relying as it does on the analysis of massive datasets – still faces the thorny problem of
initial generalised collection (Murphy 2016). A crucial question at the heart of this issue
is how the intrusion formed at the various stages of data collection is categorised. Euro-
pean jurisprudence appears to recognise that intrusion repeatedly occurs at the points
of collection, retention, and use – even where no human scrutiny is involved.39 Some intel-
ligence agencies, on the other hand, maintain that the solely algorithmic processing of
personal data involves minimal if any interference with privacy rights (EFF n.d.; Corera
2015). Former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, equates mass retention
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of data to a library which contains many books, most of which are never read. According to
Clapper’s reasoning, the protection of rights only becomes important at the point where
the authorities decide which books to ‘open up and actually read’ (Schneier 2015, 129).
Historically, distinctions between different types of data and different uses of data have
been readily accepted by the ECtHR. For example, as early asMalone v UK and more recently
in cases such as Uzun v Germany, there has been clear acknowledgement from the Court
that the collection of non-content data requires less safeguards than the collection of
content data.40 While mass surveillance and algorithmic processing is not solely carried
out using metadata, it is very often the case that metadata is most useful to these tech-
niques.41 Historically, individuals may not have felt that their telecommunication records
constituted sensitive personal information. The increased generation and granularity of
such data, combined with sophisticated data mining capabilities, has made the naivety of
that position apparent. In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, the position of the
two major European courts appears to have evolved. The first post-Snowden privacy
decision of the CJEU appeared to reflect a shift in perception on this issue.
Recent developments at the CJEU and the ECtHR
In the ruling in Digital Rights Ireland, the European Union’s highest court examined the val-
idity of the Data Retention Directive42 which had mandated that Member States require
the retention of all communications metadata for between 6 and 24 months.43 The
CJEU demonstrated awareness of the potentially exposing nature of metadata and
stated that the retained data had the potential to
allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose
data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of
residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those
persons and the social environments frequented by them.44
The CJEU found the general application of the Data Retention Directive to be incompatible
with the right to respect for private life and the right to protection of personal data as pro-
tected by Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter. In particular, the CJEU criticised the Directive for
requiring the collection of metadata on ‘all persons and all means of electronic communi-
cation as well as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception being
made’.45 The CJEU was especially critical of the blanket application of the Directive and
pointed out that the Directive did ‘not require any relationship between the data whose
retention is provided for and a threat to public security’.46 The CJEU accepted that data reten-
tion could be an appropriate means to achieve the legitimate prevention of serious crime and
terrorism,47 but clarified that mass data retention could only be justified where ‘strictly
necessary’.48 Accordingly, the CJEU asserted that data retention legislation must contain
clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure in question and
imposing minimum safeguards so that the persons whose data have been retained have suf-
ficient guarantees to effectively protect their personal data against the risk of abuse and
against any unlawful access and use of that data.49
There is a degree of uncertainty as to the precise intention of the ruling in Digital Rights
Ireland. While the immediate invalidity of the Data Retention Directive was clear, there
is some disagreement as to whether the decision allows for the generalised collection
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of data on all individuals where rigorous safeguards are in place. While the CJEU openly
criticised the legislation for not limiting retention to data ‘pertaining to a particular time
period and/or a particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of particular persons
likely to be involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime’,50 it is possible that the
CJEU would accept the compatibility of such a system where extensive safeguards were
provided in the form of strong review, accountability, security requirements, and access
restrictions.51 This interpretation gained support recently with the release of an advisory
Opinion where Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe endorsed the contention that
general data retention obligations ‘do not go beyond the bounds of what is strictly necess-
ary, provided that they are accompanied by certain safeguards concerning access to the
data, the period of retention and the protection and security of the data’.52 The dearth of
specific safeguards in the text of the Data Retention Directive obviated the need to decide
this point explicitly in Digital Rights Ireland as the legislation was clearly unsatisfactory.
While further clarification from the CJEU is awaited, it is certainly clear that the Court
has strong misgivings about generalised collection and has signalled the fact that bulk sur-
veillance programmes will be subject to heightened scrutiny going forward.
The remaining ambiguity regarding the application of the EU Charter to domestic sur-
veillance operations combined with the human rights mandate and broad membership of
the Council of Europe means that the ECtHR will continue to play an essential role in the
limitation of surveillance powers in Europe.53 While the ECtHR has previously been influ-
enced by data protection law developments in its jurisprudence, the impact of the CJEU
and the Charter is strikingly apparent in two recent decisions of the ECtHR, Zakharov
and Szabó (De Hert and Gutwirth 2009, 18). Both decisions cited the ruling in Digital
Rights Ireland and in both cases the ECtHR recognised that general surveillance pro-
grammes represent a significant threat to the protection of privacy. Of particular note is
the statement from the Grand Chamber in Zakharov that interception authorisations must
clearly identify a specific person to be placed under surveillance or a single set of premises as
the premises in respect of which the authorisation is ordered. Such identification may be
made by names, addresses, telephone numbers or other relevant information.54
This point, combined with the assertion that surveillance authorising bodies must be
‘capable of verifying the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person con-
cerned’,55 could be read to render generalised surveillance techniques inherently at
odds with the ECHR.
While some have interpreted the subsequent decision in Szabó to constitute evidence
of a fundamental incompatibility of mass surveillance with human rights, certain aspects
of that decision suggest otherwise (St Vincent 2016). While the Fourth Section Court cited
the Grand Chamber judgment in Zakharov extensively,56 the majority ruling also indicated
openness to the potential remediating effect of an extensive system of safeguards.
Notably, the ECtHR stated that it is ‘a natural consequence of the forms taken by
present-day terrorism that governments resort to cutting-edge technologies in pre-
empting such attacks, including the massive monitoring of communications susceptible
to containing indications of impending incidents’.57 The ECtHR has a record of avoiding
in depth consideration of the reasonableness of surveillance measures and has instead
required states to provide rigorous safeguards. While the regime examined in Szabó
was easily found to be in violation of Article 8 under the existing standards, the ECtHR
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also speculated on the need to develop further safeguards sufficient to secure privacy
rights.58 Even though the decision in Szabó recognises mass surveillance as a particularly
intrusive form of surveillance, it is not improbable that the ECtHR may choose to develop a
newly enhanced system of safeguards in an effort to prevent abuse of mass surveillance
capabilities.59 It is possible that an enhanced role for data minimisation and filtering algor-
ithms could be an aspect of such a development. On the positive side, it appears likely that
if the ECtHR does sanction a role for mass surveillance in democratic societies, it is also
likely to revise its finding in Liberty v the United Kingdom and find that different, more strin-
gent standards for accessibility and clarity will be necessary to ensure compliance.60
Conclusion
Following a successful terrorist attack, frightened citizens and embattled governments
often seek to understand, to investigate, to cast blame, and to shield themselves from
accusations that they failed to act in response. In the face of incomprehensible loss and
violence, a desire to know more can lead to a call to know a notional ‘everything’. It is
this desire that can partially explain unscientific positions such as that expressed by
former Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), General Keith Alexander, ‘you
need the haystack to find the needle’ (Gellman and Soltani 2013a). While investigatory
authorities may be tempted to ‘collect it all’ (Nakashima and Warrick 2013a), there is a
clear risk that accumulating masses of data from multiple sources over extended
periods of time will result in an unmanageable glut of information beyond the compre-
hension of those tasked to act on the intelligence (De Zwart, Humphreys, and Van
Dissel 2014, 717). The Snowden leaks indicated that this has been acknowledged as a
very real issue by some within the NSA (Maass 2015; Rowley 2014).
Increased processing power and more finely tuned algorithms are often portrayed as
the solution to the haystack conundrum. While a human may struggle with an overflowing
haystack, powerful computers can take a logical and structured approach that will make
the haystack eminently more searchable (Wells 2016).61 This article discussed some of
the key flaws in this argument and also highlighted how human rights issues will
persist even in the event of a significant technological breakthrough. It is difficult to dis-
mantle a complex apparatus once it has been constructed, particularly when that appar-
atus has – at least in part – been driven by the interests of the modern government
surveillance industrial complex (O’Harrow, Priest, and Censer 2013; Mueller 2006).
Indeed, advocates for increased collection and retention are prone to argue that ‘any fail-
ures of intelligence simply indicate underinvestment’ rather than any flaws in the
approach (Citron and Pasquale 2011, 1475). This is why it is so critical that the implications
of algorithmic surveillance are considered at the earliest possible point.
Both the CJEU and the ECtHR have recognised that greater safeguards are required
where personal data are subject to automatic processing.62 While this position is logical
in light of the increased risks of such processing, it is necessary to confront the supposition
that an upgrade of existing safeguards can address the unique issues created by mass col-
lection and algorithmic processing of citizen information. It is difficult to predict the scope
of potential harms at this early stage and it is challenging to fully grasp the risk due to the
complexity of the technologies and techniques underlying the simple promise of
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enhanced safety. This article maintains that caution as opposed to haste is the appropriate
mindset at this crucial stage.
While technology evangelists may argue that existing human rights standards are out-
dated and antagonistic to our information driven futures and champions of surveillance
may contend that human rights are secondary to security, it is important to remember
that human rights standards were not created in a vacuum (Plouffe 2016; Schneier
2008). They were developed in order to protect fundamental democratic values
deemed necessary to protect essential freedoms (Weil 1963, 27).63 Where traditional safe-
guards, designed to protect human rights, hinder the development or use of a new tech-
nology, the reasons for that conflict must be fully examined. As human rights bodies
continue to reckon with the risks of mass data collection and the relationship of algorith-
mic processing to that practice, the response should not be a rushed search for a work-
around or an attempt to shoehorn new controls into traditional categories. If it appears
that the new technologies cannot work within the boundaries of human rights law,
society should first revaluate the use of the technology before reformulating fundamental
ideals (Murphy 2016).
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